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Supreme Court No. 20,195 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
JAN B. MIDGLEY 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
MATTHEW T. MIDGLEY 
Defendant and Appellant. 
000O000 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from an Amended Decree of Divorce entered 
August 21, 1984 in the Fourth District Court whereby an original 
Decree of Divorce was amended to reduce child support from the 
amount of $250.00 per month to the amount of $150.00 per month, 
only prospectively, and Plaintiff was granted extended visitation 
with his minor son, but in such a way as to make such visits 
impractical. Appellant contends that these terms of the Amended 
Decree of Divorce were contrary to a Stipulation of the parties 
and were outside the discretion of the Court. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Amended Decree of Divorce was entered in the lower Court 
after an initial Stipulation as to terms, several motions and 
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o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e form of t h e D e c r e e , and r u l i n g s t h e r e o n . 
Defendant appea l s from the f i n a l form of the Decree . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAR 
Appel lan t seeks two c h a n g e s in form in t h e f i n a l Amended 
Decree of D i v o r c e . P a r a g r a p h 6a s h o u l d be amended t o a l l o w 
D e f e n d a n t f i v e weeks of c o n s e c u t i v e v i s i t a t i o n w i t h h i s son 
dur ing 1985 and s i x weeks of consecu t i ve v i s i t a t i o n dur ing 1986. 
P a r a g r a p h 7 s h o u l d be amended t o g r a n t P l a i n t i f f t h e sum of 
$150.00 p e r month a s c h i l d s u p p o r t f o r t h e minor c h i l d from t h e 
da te of the o r i g i n a l Decree , May 4, 1982. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The p a r t i e s t o t h i s a c t i o n were mar r ied on May 21 , 1981, in 
P e o r i a , Arizona. They a r e the p a r e n t s of Tyler Kenneth Midgley, 
born on A p r i l 1 5 , 1 9 8 1 . On August 24 , 1 9 8 1 , Responden t f i l e d a 
C o m p l a i n t f o r D i v o r c e in t h e F o u r t h D i s t r l i c t C o u r t . De fendan t 
was s e r v e d w i t h t h e Summons and C o m p l a i n t on O c t o b e r 19 , 1981 . 
Mo f u r t h e r a c t i o n was t a k e n by e i t h e r p a r t y u n t i l a D e f a u l t 
C e r t i f i c a t e was f i l e d by P l a i n t i f f ' s a t t p r n e y on May 4, 1982. 
The Decree of D i v o r c e was g r a n t e d and e n t e r e d t h e same day . On 
May 2 5 , 1982 De fendan t f i l e d a Motion t o $ e t Aside t h e Judgment 
and D e c r e e a l o n g w i t h an A f f i d a v i t t h a t t h e p a r t i e s had 
r e c o n c i l e d s u b s e q u e n t t o t h e s e r v i c e of t h e Summons and 
Complaint ; and t h a t they had cont inued t o l i v e t o g e t h e r u n t i l May 
2, 1982, only two days before the Decree w^s ob ta ined . Defendant 
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a l s o a l l e g e d t h a t he had been led t o b e l i e v e t h a t the d ivo rce 
a c t i o n would not be pursued and t h a t , i f he had known t h a t 
P l a i n t i f f was going forward, he would have defended agains t i t , 
as i t was not granted on terms which were reasonable. The Court 
made a w r i t t e n r u l i n g on December 20, 1982 g r a n t i n g t h e 
Defendant ' s Motion t o Set Aside the Judgment and Decree and 
ordering Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim to be f i led (R. 28) . 
The case was s e t for t r i a l on Apr i l 4, 1983 a t which t ime 
both p a r t i e s appeared by counsel. At tha t t ime, i t was s ta ted to 
the Court t h a t both p a r t i e s , on the unde r s t and ing t h a t they had 
been d ivo rced , had now g o t t e n r e m a r r i e d . Counsel for Appel lan t 
s t a t e d : 
We, t h e r e f o r e , ask the Cour t ' s pe rmi s s ion t o withdraw 
t h a t Motion, [ the Motion to Set Aside the Decree] i f we 
may, and enter a S t ipu la t ion for a Modification of the 
Decree so t h a t we d o n ' t mess up t h e s u b s e q u e n t 
marriage, which she entered in to in good f a i th (R. 153). 
The changes in the Divorce Decree were then read i n t o the 
record by counsel for Appellant as follows: 
A l r i g h t . I ' l l do t h a t , your Honor. The pa rag raphs to 
be modified in the Decree of May 4th would be paragraph 
7 regarding v i s i t a t i o n , which would be modified to read 
t h a t dur ing the year 1983, Mr. Midgley would r ece ive 
three weeks v i s i t a t i o n with the minor chi ld to be non-
c o n s e c u t i v e . The exac t t imes and d a t e s t o be worked 
out between the p a r t i e s . And tha t each year he rea f te r , 
u n t i l i t reaches a maximum of s ix weeks, t h a t would 
increase — the t o t a l v i s i t a t i o n would increase by one 
week. So t h i s year three weeks, next year four weeks, 
and so on u n t i l i t g e t s t o s i x . The exac t t imes and 
places to be worked out between the p a r t i e s . 
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And once the six weeks goes into effbct, the parties 
will divide the costs of transporting the child back 
and forth, because the child will then be old enough to 
travel on his own. 
Paragraph 8 would be modified to decrease the support 
from $250.00 to $150.00. I believe that's all, your 
honor (R. 154-155). 
Counsel for Appellant then drafted the Order Modifying the 
Decree(R. 33-35)which was approved as to form by counsel for 
Respondent, and was signed by the Court on May 2, 1983. That 
Order Modifying the Decree stated in paragraph 2 that the modifi-
cations of the Decree were "nunc pro tunc" and then stated the 
visitation and support Orders as follows: 
a. Defendant is hereby granted reasonable visitation 
rights with his minor son, to include at least three 
weeks during the year 1983, to increasle to four weeks 
during 1984, five weeks during 19^5, and six weeks 
during 1986 and subsequent years. Th4 three weeks of 
visitation during 1983 shall be non-consecutive, due to 
the age of the minor child. 
c. Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff the sum of 
$150.00 per month for support and maintenance of the 
minor child of the parties until said bhild should die, 
marry or reach the age of majority, whichever should 
first occur. Said payments shall commence in March, 
1983 (R. 34). 
The original Decree was then confirmed in a|Ll other respects. 
Shortly after the entry of the Order Modifying the Decree, 
Respondent's counsel withdrew and was replaced by present counsel 
for Respondent. New Counsel for Respondent filed motions making 
a claim that the Stipulation was entered ihto without authority, 
and when this claim was denied (R. 84) made various claims that 
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c o u n s e l f o r A p p e l l a n t had i m p r o p e r l y d r a f t e d t h e O r d e r . The 
c o u r t , by r u l i n g of J u n e 1 9 , 1984 (R. 1 0 6 - 1 0 7 ) r u l e d t h a t t h e 
" n u n c p r o t u n c " l a n g u a g e s h o u l d be s t r i c k e n f rom t h e O r d e r 
a m e n d i n g t h e C o m p l a i n t . T h i s r u l i n g k e p t t h e c h i l d s u p p o r t i n 
e f f e c t a t t h e h i g h e r l e v e l u n t i l t h e D e c r e e was a m e n d e d . The 
C o u r t t h e n d i r e c t e d c o u n s e l f o r R e s p o n d e n t t o d r a f t a new O r d e r , 
which Order r e s t a t e d v i s i t a t i o n a s f o l l o w s : 
6A. The D e f e n d a n t i s g r a n t e d r e a s o n a b l e v i s i t a t i o n 
r i g h t s w i t h h i s mino r s o n , TYLER KENNETH MIDGLEY, whose 
d a t e of b i r t h i s A p r i l 1 5 , 1 9 8 1 , w h i c h r e a s o n a b l e 
v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s s h a l l i n c l u d e t h r e e w e e k s of n o n -
c o n s e c u t i v e v i s i t a t i o n d u r i n g t h e summer of 1 9 8 3 ; w i t h 
an i n c r e a s e e a c h s u c c e e d i n g y e a r of one week, u n t i l t h e 
maximum v i s i t a t i o n of s i x w e e k s h a s b e e n a c h i e v e d . 
(1983 - t h r e e w e e k s ; 1984 - f o u r w e e k s ; 1985 - f i v e 
w e e k s ; 1986 - s i x weeks) The e x a c t t i m e s and d a t e s of 
v i s i t a t i o n a r e t o be w o r k e d o u t b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s . 
wgek.*. The D e f e n d a n t s h a l l r e q u e s t v i s i t a t i o n a t l e a s t 
one week b e f o r e any p r o p o s e d v i s i t a t i o n d a t e , and s h a l l 
o b t a i n t h e a g r e e m e n t of t h e P l a i n t i f f i n a r r i v i n g a t 
e x a c t t i m e s and d a t e s f o r s a i d v i s i t a t i o n , ( e m p h a s i s 
a d d e d ) . 
By O r d e r of A u g u s t 2 0 , 1 9 8 4 , t h e l o w e r c o u r t d e n i e d 
A p p e l l a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e u n d e r l i n e d l a n g u a g e a b o v e , and 
s i g n e d t h e Amended D e c r e e of D i v o r c e a s d r a f t e d by c o u n s e l f o r 
R e s p o n d e n t t h e same d a y . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER ERRED IN ALTERING THE STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES 
WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THOSE PARTIES, WHICH STIPULATION WAS 
ENTERED INTO FREELY AND LAWFULLY. 
I t i s s e t t l e d l a w t h a t an a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t w o p a r t i e s 
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should be cons t rued by a cour t so as to give e f f e c t to what the 
p a r t i e s intended a t the time the agreement was made. Du£oij2_vsJl 
£&e, 584 P.2d 823 (Utah 1978). The agreement i s to be cons t rued 
in l i g h t of the r easonab le e x p e c t a t i o n $ of the p a r t i e s as 
evidenced by the purpose and language of the agreement . Hixorj 
an£UilixSmj^n£U^SjL-d£h^ 641 P. 2d 14 4 (Utah 
1982). The in t e rp re t ing Court should "detetmine what the p a r t i e s 
in tended by lock ing a t the e n t i r e c o n t r a c t and a l l of i t s p a r t s 
in r e l a t i o n t o each o t h e r , g iv ing an o b j e c t i v e and reasonab le 
construct ion to the contract as a whole. " Sears vs. Riemersma, 
655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982) . In t h i s c a s e , t h e c o n t r a c t or 
s t i p u l a t i o n was a r r i v e d a t over s e v e r a l weeks of n e g o t i a t i o n 
between the counsel for the respect ive p a r t i e s . The main terms 
of the S t i p u l a t i o n were read i n t o the record , and were reduced t o 
w r i t i n g by counse l for Appe l l an t . That w r i t i n g was sen t t o 
counsel for Respondent, who approved i t as t o form, before i t was 
s igned by the Court . P r e s e n t counsel f|or Respondent, a f t e r 
making h i s appearance , contended t h a t the S t i p u l a t i o n was not 
en t e r ed i n t o wi th a u t h o r i t y of the Respondent (R.49-51), which 
contention was contested by Respondent's ealrl ier counsel, Richard 
H i l l . Mr. Hi l l t e s t i f i e d by Affidavi t : 
5. That, before signing h is approval ,as to form on the 
Order coming out of tha t hearing, he i^ ead tha t Order to 
h i s c l i e n t in fu l l over the telephone and was informed 
by her that she understood and agreed to i t (R. 65-66). 
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The Court, by ruling of February 7, 1984, rejected the 
contention of Respondent's new counsel that the Stipulation was 
improperly entered into, by stating: 
The Court notes that Richard Hill, Plaintiff's former 
attorney, filed an Affidavit whereby he swears that his 
client authorized him to agree to the Stipulation 
presented to the Court on April 4. Plaintiff is bound 
by that Stipulation. (R. 84-85). 
Again, counsel for Respondent objected to the way the Order 
was drawn, and asked for further hearing. In a hearing held on 
March 16, 1984, the Court again rejected the contentions of 
Respondent that the Stipulation of the parties was improperly 
entered into, in the following conversation held between counsel 
for Respondent and the Court: 
Mr. Jepson: Sure. The present dispute is simply 
resolved from the fact that she says she did not agree 
to have Mr. Hill come into Court and stipulate to that. 
And there is an Affidavit on file concerning that. 
The Court: Mr. Hill says he was authorized to do it, 
and I've got to accept that. 
Mr. Jepson: I understand that. 
The Court: Mow, lets get the Decree prepared in 
accordance with that, Mr. McCullough (R. 170). 
The duty of the Court, as stated in the court decisions 
recited above, is to find and enforce the intention of the 
parties. The Court ruled that the Stipulation was a valid one, 
and relied on the Affidavit of Mr. Hill for its ruling. As is 
the case in many stipulations and other agreements, only the 
general substance of the agreement was read into the record on 
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April 4, 1983. It was up to counsel to present the complete 
agreement in writing, in precise enough teribs so that it could be 
enforced with minimal misunderstanding. Counsel for the parties 
herein agreed on the draft of that Stipulation, as evidenced by 
the approval of Mr. Hill as to form. Mr. Hill signed an 
Affidavit that he had gone over the terms of that agreement with 
his client before he signed it. The Court accepted all that. 
The Court then, by its ruling of June 19 (R. 106-107) and by its 
subsequent ruling of August 20 (R. 126) ruled that the written 
version of the Stipulation as presented by counsel for Appellant, 
approved by counsel for Respondent, and th^n signed by the Court, 
was not in fact the agreement. The Court ruled that the oral 
version of the Stipulation superseded the written version, which 
ruling is in error. The oral version was not the version that 
Mr. Hill specifically agreed to in writlinq, and was not the 
version that his client specifically agreed to when it was read 
to her over the telephone. The Court may not substitute its 
version of the agreement for what clearly was the agreement 
between the parties, in its final form. 
The Court in its ruling of June 19, previously referred to, 
seems to be of the opinion that the agreement was a simple 
modification of a previously entered Decre^ of Divorce. The Utah 
Code, in §30-4a-l U.C.A., specifically allows that an Order 
relating to a divorce may be entered "nunc pro tunc". This Court 
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has not yet ruled, however, that such an Order is appropriate in 
the case of a previously entered support Order, see Larsen vs. 
LaiS&Ui 561 P.2d 1077 (Utah 1977). That situation, however is 
not relevant here. The Court set aside the Decree of Divorce in 
this matter by its ruling of December 20, 1982. The parties, as 
part of the Stipulation at issue here, agreed to reinstate the 
Decree with changes. The reason for that reinstatement was that 
the parties had both subsequently remarried. The parties there-
fore agreed that the reinstatement would be "nunc pro tunc", as 
would the changes. Before the Stipulation was entered into, of 
course, there was no Decree of Divorce, as per the ruling of 
December 20, 1982. Therefore, the Court erroneously ordered that 
the original $250.00 per month payments of support under the set 
aside Decree were in effect until the modification, which modifi-
cation was only prospective. Neither the support Order new any 
other part of the Decree of Divorce was in effect until the 
Stipulation was entered into. That Stipulation allowed the Order 
to be reinstated only with the change of support amounts. There-
fore, the lower amount of support is the only effective Order of 
support entered by this Court. The parties stipulated to that 
being the fact, and the Court has no authority a year later to 
change that Stipulation. 
The Stipulation also gave Defendant a period of visitation 
with his minor child every year. The child was born April 15, 
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1981. When the Decree was first entered in August of 1981, the 
child was only six months old. When the Stipulation was entered 
into in April of 1983, the child was only one year old, and 
hardly knew his father. Therefore, the Stipulation was that the 
initial visitation be structured to avoid a lengthy period of 
time away from his mother. Defendant agreed to take his first 
three weeks of visitation non-consecutively, for that purpose. 
As the stipulated periods of visitation increase, of course, 
non-consecutive weeks are clearly inappropriate, and clearly were 
not agreed to. When the child goes to school, his father will 
have a right to visit with him for six weeks a year. Obviously, 
he cannot exercise those six weeks non-consecutively without 
taking the child out of school. This was never intended by the 
parties, and the final form of the lower court's Order is not 
only in error, it is intolerable. 
CONCLUSION 
The two specific areas of the Amended Decree of Divorce the 
provisions of which are at issue here, should be vacated and 
entered as previously stated in the Order amending the Decree of 
Divorce drafted by Appellant's counsel, and approved as to form 
by Respondent's counsel. The child support, from the day of the 
Divorce, should be $150.00 per child. The visitation periods 
given Defendant with his minor child should not be made on non-
consecutive weeks, which visitation provisions effectively deny 
10 
Defendant the periods of visitation he was granted. In the 
alternative, this Court should remand those issues to the trial 
court for a hearing on what in fact were the agreed upon 
provisions of the Stipulation. At such a hearing, Mr. Hill could 
be present and subject to cross-examination concerning his 
remembrances of the agreement. Appellant submits, however, that 
by approving the written Stipulation drafted by counsel for 
Appellant, and by stating in his Affidavit that the terms of the 
written Stipulation were read to and approved by his client, Mr. 
Hill has effectively presented his viewpoint that Appellant's 
position is correct. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMI' :TTED this
 t JH day of December, 1984. 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH 
Attorney for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Appellant's Brief, postage prepaid, to Arron F. 
Jepson, Attorney for Respondent, 1 East Center Street, Suite 300, 
Provo, Utah 84601, this _i_Lr day of December, 1984. 
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